Several types of experiences in response to suggestions to have a dream are described, namely: (a) simply thinking about something; (b) daydreaming; (c) vivid hallucinations, like watching a film; and (d) feeling "bodily located in" a "dream world." In 2 experiments, only a minority of Ss rated their experiences as dreamlike, even when hypnotized. Significant positive relationships were found between the extent to which the experiences were rated as vivid and dreamlike, and 2 measures of hypnotic depth. The variable of whether or not Ss had gone through a hypnotic-induction procedure did not discriminate among types of response. These results illustrate the danger of pseudooperational definitions of hypnosis that ignore Ss' subjective responses.
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Several types of experiences in response to suggestions to have a dream are described, namely: (a) simply thinking about something; (b) daydreaming; (c) vivid hallucinations, like watching a film; and (d) feeling "bodily located in" a "dream world." In 2 experiments, only a minority of Ss rated their experiences as dreamlike, even when hypnotized. Significant positive relationships were found between the extent to which the experiences were rated as vivid and dreamlike, and 2 measures of hypnotic depth. The variable of whether or not Ss had gone through a hypnotic-induction procedure did not discriminate among types of response. These results illustrate the danger of pseudooperational definitions of hypnosis that ignore Ss' subjective responses.
It has long been known that if a hypnotized subject is instructed to dream, many subjects will subsequently report an experience in response to this suggestion. This response is conventionally referred to as the hypnotic dream, although Barber (1960) has shown that similar responses can be obtained under conditions of waking suggestion. As has been discussed at length elsewhere (Tart, 1965) , observation suggests that there are a variety of experiential responses to dream suggestions, in contrast to the unity implied by the term hypnotic dream, and that for both theoretical and practical reasons some attempt must be made to discriminate these various experiential responses. The present paper will report on two experiments in which lie subjects classified their experiences into several distinct types, and in which the relationship of response type to two measures of hypnotic responsiveness or depth was investigated.
METHOD
The present data are taken from a larger study (Hilgard & Tart, 1966 ) of responses to suggestions following hypnotic induction versus simply asking the subjects to imagine that the suggestions were true. The large study actually consisted of two 1 This paper was written during the tenure of a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship from the National Institute of Mental Health, United States Public Health Service. I would also like to thank Ernest R. Hilgard for his helpful comments on this paper, and the numerous staff members of the Laboratory of Hypnosis Research who aided in collecting the data reported herein. The author is now at the Department of Psychiatry, University of Virginia.
experiments, the Fall sample and the Winter sample, with slight procedural variations, noted below.
The subjects were male and female students enrolled in the introductory psychology course at Stanford who elected to fulfill part of their course requirement of participating in experiments by acting as subjects in this hypnosis study. Each subject participated in two experimental sessions, spread over 2 consecutive days.
On each subject's first day, a self-report scale of hypnotic depth or state was explained to him, as described below. He was then given one of the three experimental treatments, and then 10 suggestibility items from a slightly modified version of Form C of the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale (SHSS; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) .
The three treatments for the Fall sample were: (a) normal waking state; (6) instructions to imagine that the things the experimenter suggested were true; and (c) a formal hypnotic induction from the SHSS. On the second day all subjects were given a formal hypnotic induction prior to the SHSS items, as for group c's first day.
For the Winter sample, the three treatments were: (a) instructions to imagine that the suggestions were true; (b) the same imagination instructions, but with the explicit instructions that this might produce a hypnotic state; and (c) a formal hypnotic induction procedure, as with the Fall sample. On the second day subjects were again assigned to one of these three conditions, rather than all being given a formal hypnotic induction.
With the Fall sample, staff members of the Laboratory of Hypnosis Research acted as experimenterhypnotists, with no subject having the same experimenter on both days. In the Winter sample, however, the instructions, induction, and test items were tape recorded because of a finding of significant experimenter bias in the Fall sample (Troffer & Tart, 1964) . In the Fall sample, experimenters were judged to have acted more "hypnotically" in the induction condition. This bias is not particularly relevant to the present material, however. At the end of the second day's session for the Fall sample, each subject was asked to characterize his experience in response to the dream suggestions as follows: (a) just thinking about the reported topic; (6) daydreaming or fantasying about the reported topic; (c) having vivid hallucinations about the reported topic, like watching a film; (d) a dreamlike 2 experience, which was not only vivid, but in which the subject seemed to be located "in" a "dream world" of experience; and (e) some other type of experience. The subject was also asked to characterize his previous day's experience in retrospect. For the Winter sample, the subjects made this characterization of their experiences at the end of each day.
The subjects were instructed to use a simple, selfreport state scale as follows:
During the experiment we are going to do today, we are interested in the degree to which your state of mind stays the same or changes. That is, at various times, we are going to want to know what state of mind you are in. In order to make it easy and convenient for you to tell me this, I am going to teach you a rating scale for doing this. This way, when you are asked 'State?,' you'll just call out a number to indicate your state, instead of having to explain it. 2 The adjective "dreamlike" is used here because the feeling of being "bodily located in" a "dream world" of experience seemed, a priori, an essential characteristic of night dreams. To check this assumption, the author included the question, "Were you to.the dream world or just watching the dream scene?" on dream report forms filled out by students in his psychology courses on sleep and dreaming during the 1964-1965 academic year. Of 65 dreams from male subjects and 83 dreams from female subjects, the feeling of being "in" the dream was reported for 82% and 98% of the dreams, respectively, so the assumption of this feeling being a usual (albeit not absolutely necessary) characteristic of dreams seems tenable.
Here's what the numbers are to represent. Zero indicates that you are normally awake and alert, just as you are now. One indicates that you are in a sort of borderline state, that is, a condition like the one you experience as you fall asleep at night, a time when you're not quite awake and not quite asleep. There are several things that make you aware of being in a borderline state. You may find that your thoughts are drifting a lot, or perhaps that you're daydreaming, or perhaps that your mind goes blank for periods of time. Any or all of these things can occur in the borderline state. Do you know what I mean? (Experimenter reexplains if subject replies negatively.)
Now a report of two on the scale indicates that you are in some sort of trance-like or hypnoticlike condition. You may never have experienced such a condition before, but if you get into such a state you'll recognize it as being an unusual state of mind. If this state is not only recognizable but strong, you should report three, and if it's very strong and impressive, report {our. Do you get the idea? (If subject replies negatively, reexplain.) OK, let me explain how you're to do this reporting. When you are asked, 'State?,' you are to call out the first number that pops into your mind, and this will represent your state at the time. We've found that this first impression is more accurate than if you stop to think about just what the number should be. This may seem a little hard to do at first, but it will get easy as you go along. Just call out the first number that pops into your mind whenever you are asked 'State?' Of course, if you think that the first number you've called out is way off, you can call out a correction, but this rarely happens.
The experimenter made sure the subject understood the scale before going on. The subjects never reported four.
RESULTS
The experimenters occasionally were unable to conduct the dream inquiry with subjects due to time pressure. Usable data were obtained, however, from 58 subjects in the Fall sample and 92 subjects in the Winter sample. Table 1 presents the distribution of the number of subjects reporting each of the various types of responses to the dream suggestions. The 2 days of each experiment are noted separately. The "no dream" column indicates that the subject simply reported that he had not dreamed when he was asked to describe what he had dreamed about. The "intermediate" column indicates the number of subjects who categorized their experience as "half-way" between two categories; these are totaled together as there were not enough of any one kind to make separate analyses feasible. For three subjects on Day 1 and two subjects on Day 2 of the Winter sample there was no classification of the reported experience on the record sheet because of the experimenter's error.
There are significant differences 3 between the distributions of responses in the two experiments, but as sample differences are confounded with differing experimental procedures, these differences are uninterpretable. Ignoring treatment differences (as will be justified below), the overall means for both experiments indicate that the most frequent response to the dream suggestions was "no dream" or "thinking." Responses of "dreamlike" are infrequent, being reported only about 11% of the time.
Judging by the infrequent use of the "other" and "intermediate" categories, the subjects seemed to have little difficulty in fitting their experiences into the classification system. A detailed reading of subjects' comments made during the dream inquiry, however, indicates that the "thinking" and "no dream" categories were often confused, many subjects apparently reporting "no dream" when they had thought about something. In the remain-3 It is legitimate to compare the distribution of responses on Day 1 of one sample with Day 1 of the other sample, as well as Day 2 versus Day 2. If this is done, combining the "thinking" and "no dream" categories and ignoring the "no dream data" category, the distribution of responses is significantly different for Day 1 (x 2 = 20.365 with 5 df, p < .005) and for Day 2 (x 2 = 13.705 with 5 df, p< .02), Day 1 cannot be compared with Day 2 within a sample, however, because the same subjects are used on both days, and under different experimental treatments.
ing analyses of this paper, therefore, the "thinking" and "no dream" categories will be combined.
The "other" responses of the subjects in both samples range over a wide variety of experiences, including comparing their responses to hypnagogic imagery, pressure phosphenes, quick flashes, static images, and emphasizing the voluntary effort needed to produce an image. Table 2 presents the distribution of responses * for each day of the two samples with respect to experimental treatment. Although there is a slight tendency for "dreamlike" and "hallucinatory" responses to be more frequent with hypnosis, chi-square tests of the distributions within the main categories ("dreamlike, watching a film, daydreaming, and thinking + no dream") show that the experimental treatment is not significantly related to the distribution of responses. Experimental treatment will therefore be ignored in further analyses.
If the assumption is made that the main response categories, dreamlike ("in" a dream), watching a film, daydreaming, and thinking + no dream, represent a rank ordering of response along a dimension of vividness and complexity, with "dreamlike" being the strongest response, some interesting relations emerge. Table 2 and subsequent tables do not always add up to the total number of subjects in the study. This is because occasional subjects had to be dropped from a particular analysis because they had not had a state report at the time of the dream item, had given an intermediate dream classification, etc. Also, adjacent groups are sometimes combined in the table when the N in any one cell would have been too low. The total responsiveness of a subject to hypnotic test items is conventionally used as a measure of trance depth or profundity. Ignoring experimental treatment and looking only at the total responsiveness of each subject, we find that greater hypnotic responsiveness or trance depth (sum of all items of the SHSS passed, excepting the dream item) is associated with more vivid and dreamlike responses. The mean number of items passed with respect to type of experience is presented in Table 3 for each day of both samples. Analysis of variance for the main categories indicates that there are significant differences in means at the .001 level, with the same patterning appearing on every day.
*The total JVs of
The State Reports obtained from the subjects provide an indication of how hypnotized the subjects feel, or, alternatively, another indication of hypnotic depth. 5 Table 4 presents the distribution of response types with respect to the State Report obtained at the end of the dream item, when the experimenter (or tape) said, "The dream is over. State?" Chi-square tests of the distributions of responses for each day of both experiments indicate a significant association between State Report and type of response, with higher (3) Hypnotized (2) Borderline ( State Reports being associated with more vivid and dreamlike responses. The overall significance of this relationship for the four experimental days may be assessed using the method of Jones and Fiske (1953) , yielding p < .001. Thus subjects who report feeling more hypnotized, regardless of experimental treatment, report more vivid and dreamlike responses to the dream suggestions.
DISCUSSION
The subjects of the present study were asked to make only relatively simple distinctions about the nature of their experiences in response to the dream suggestions, distinctions which will undoubtedly be refined in future work. Yet the results demonstrate clearly that such distinctions are necessary in the study of hypnotic dreams for three reasons. First, only a minority of responses are described as dreamlike by the subjects, even those who 6 Although the State Report obtained just as the dream item was finished is the closest in time to the response, and presumably reflects the subject's hypnotic state during the response to the dream suggestion, it might be argued that the subject's experience in response to the suggestion contaminates his State Report, that is, he will tend to judge his state lower if he did not respond well to the suggestion. The above analysis was repeated with the State Report obtained just before the dream suggestion was given, and the same pattern of relationships was seen, with the combination of four tests giving an overall result of p < .01. feel hypnotized to some extent, so the term hypnotic "dream" is misleading. Second, the vividness and dreamlikeness of the response is related to subjects' overall suggestibility, both waking and hypnotic. Third, this dimension of vividness and dreamlikeness is also related to the degree to which the subjects feel hypnotized. This latter finding, based on the State Reports, is not merely a reflection of subjects' responses to suggestions, as was shown in the present data (see Footnote 6), as well as elsewhere (Hilgard & Tart, 1966) . Furthermore, there are a few subjects (3 out of ISO) who reported a dreamlike response ("in" a "dream world") while also reporting that they felt wide awake and normal (State Report of zero), thus underscoring Barber's (1962) question about the use of the adjective "hypnotic" with respect to these dreams.
The implications for future research on the nature of hypnotic dreams, as well as on the nature of many subjective responses brought about in hypnotic studies, have been discussed elsewhere (Tart, 1965) . The above results stress the most important implication, namely, that of facing the problem of differentiating the rich and complex responses that occur in the hypnotic situation. The varied and meaningful responses that occur to suggestions to dream cannot be indiscriminately lumped under the heading of "hypnotic dream." There is too large a gap today between a position of failing to discriminate among subjective-experiential correlates of responses to suggestion and elaborate psychoanalytical speculations concerning them. We very much need some good phenomenological descriptions and surveys of the phenomena to bridge this gap, and put complex theorizing on a more empirical basis.
A further important finding of the present study was the lack of a significant relationship between the experimental treatment, the formally defined independent variable, and the type of response to the dream suggestions, the dependent variable. That is, whether or not a subject had been given a hypnoticinduction procedure was not predictive of his dream response. This finding, coupled with the finding that the degree to which the subject felt himself to be hypnotized was highly predictive, emphasizes a point made elsewhere (Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Tart & Hilgard, in press) about the shortcomings of a pseudooperationalism increasingly prevalent in the work of some investigators who feel that they are studying hypnosis if they have gone through a hypnotic-induction procedure. It is operational to specify whether or not the induction procedure has been gone through, but to call this hypnosis seriously distorts the traditional meaning of the term. Hypnosis is a particular state of mind as far as the subject is concerned, or intervening variable, typically associated with an increase in suggestibility, and usually brought about by a formal induction procedure. However, induction procedures often do not have any effect on the subject, and, conversely, some subjects become hypnotized, judging by their perception of their own state of mind, without an induction procedure (or the test suggestions may constitute an induction). In the present study many subjects felt hypnotized in the Waking and Imagination conditions and, conversely, many subjects in the Hypnosis condition did not feel at all hypnotized as a result of the induction. The formally defined independent variable, the hypnoticinduction procedure, interacts with the sets and characteristics the subjects bring into the laboratory in a currently unknown fashion. Thus the outcome of this interaction, the intermediate variable of hypnosis assessed by the subjects' State Reports, is the effective independent variable which is related to the subjects' responses. Studies are needed to investigate the relationship between such independent variables as induction, laboratory setting, and subject characteristics and the resultant hypnotic state, but until these relationships are understood it is inefficient and misleading to equate the giving of an induction procedure with the presence of hypnosis. The present study, then, further emphasizes the need for a more adequate phenomenology of the hypnotic state, and for some criterion other than suggestibility or misleading sorts of operationalism for the presence and intensity of the hypnotic state. The state-scale measures offer some promise of meeting such a need, and this possibility will be discussed at length in the future 7 when the data from a number of studies using self-report state scales are analyzed.
